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Abstract
Prediction is a well-studied machine learning task, and prediction algorithms are core
ingredients in online products and services. Despite their centrality in the competition between
online companies who offer prediction-based products, the strategic use of prediction algorithms
remains unexplored. The goal of this paper is to examine strategic use of prediction algorithms.
We introduce a novel game-theoretic setting that is based on the PAC learning framework,
where each player (aka a prediction algorithm aimed at competition) seeks to maximize the sum
of points for which it produces an accurate prediction and the others do not. We show that
algorithms aiming at generalization may wittingly mispredict some points to perform better than
others on expectation. We analyze the empirical game, i.e., the game induced on a given sample,
prove that it always possesses a pure Nash equilibrium, and show that every better-response
learning process converges. Moreover, our learning-theoretic analysis suggests that players can,
with high probability, learn an approximate pure Nash equilibrium for the whole population
using a small number of samples.
1 Introduction
Prediction plays an important role in twenty-first century economics. In a prediction task, an
algorithm is given a sequence of examples composed of labeled instances, and its goal is to learn a
general rule that maps instances to labels. With the recent data explosion, commercial companies
can, like never before, collect massive amounts of data and employ sophisticated machine learning
algorithms to discover patterns and seek connections between different observations. For instance,
after examining a sufficient number of apartments – their characteristics and selling prices – real
estate experts may attempt to accurately predict the selling price of a new, unseen apartment.
Typically, the quality of a prediction algorithm is measured by its success in predicting the value of
an unlabeled (or unseen) instance.
However, ubiquitously prediction is not carried out in isolation. For revenue-seeking companies,
prediction is another tool that can be exploited to increase revenue. To illustrate, consider several
competing real estate experts, who provide prediction service for the selling value of apartments
on their websites. These experts gain directly from user traffic to their websites, and hence aim
to attract as many users as possible. A user, after receiving the experts’ predictions and selling
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Figure 1: A case where minimizing the square error is non-optimal. Each point is an instance-value
pair, and the user associated with each point considers a prediction as accurate if it lies inside
the segment engulfing that point. The green (dashed) line represents the predictions of expert 1,
employing the linear least squares estimators and being accurate on 20% of the points. The red
(solid) line represents the predictions of expert 2, providing an accurate prediction on 60% of the
points, and completely ignores the increasing trend of the data. Expert 1 could be considered
accurate by more points if she deviates to the regression line of expert 2 (among other deviations).
his1 apartment, can evaluate which experts were accurate2 and which were not; he will typically
decide that an expert is accurate based on his experience and/or the experience of his family and
friends. That user may decide to have future interaction with one/some of the accurate experts,
or recommend his friends to interact with them; thus, providing an accurate prediction to a user
translates to higher revenue. Interestingly, maximizing revenue and minimizing discrepancy do not
coincide in this example, as further illustrated in Figure 1, suggesting that prediction algorithms in
competition should optimize revenue explicitly, and not other measures that affect revenue only
indirectly. Despite the intuitive clarity of this tradeoff and the enormous amount of work done on
prediction in the machine learning and statistical learning communities, far too little attention has
been paid to the study of prediction in the context of competition.
In this paper we study how the selection of prediction algorithms is affected by strategic behavior
in a competitive setting, using a game-theoretic lens. We consider a space of users, where each user
is modeled as a triplet (x, y, t) of an instance, a label and a threshold, respectively. An instance
encodes public information describing the user, e.g., a real vector with his apartment’s characteristics;
the label is the value that should be predicted, e.g., the actual selling value of his apartment (that is
only revealed later); and the threshold is the “distance” he is willing to accept between a proposed
prediction and his label. Namely, a prediction f(x) is said to be accurate w.r.t. the user associated
with (x, y, t) if |f(x)− y| is less than or equal to t. In such a case, the user is satisfied and willing
to adopt the prediction, granting one monetary unit to the expert who produced the accurate
prediction. If a user is satisfied with several predictions (of several experts), he selects one uniformly
at random. Indeed, the user-model we adopt is aligned with the celebrated “Satisficing" principle of
Simon [25], and other widely-accepted models in the literature on choice prediction, e.g., the model
1For ease of exposition, third-person singular pronouns are “he” for a user and “she” for a player.
2Crucially, we assume that the predicted values and the actual ones are independent. This is arguably the case if
experts are external, and not buyers nor real-estate brokers. Consequently, users care for accurate prediction and not
over-estimation.
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of selection based on small samples [4, 10]. Several players (companies or experts) are equipped
with infinite strategy spaces, or hypothesis classes in learning-theoretic terminology. A player’s
strategy space models the possible predictive functions she can employ. Players are competing for
the users, and a player’s payoff is the expected number of users who find her predictions to be
accurate, in the aforementioned sense. To model uncertainty w.r.t. the labels and thresholds, we
use the PAC-learning framework of Valiant [26]. We assume user distribution is unknown, but the
players have access to a sequence of examples, containing instances, labels and thresholds, with
which they should optimize their payoffs w.r.t. the unknown underlying user distribution.
From a machine learning perspective, we now face the challenge of what would be a good
prediction algorithm profile, i.e., a set of algorithms for the players such that no player would
deviate from her algorithm assuming the others all stick to their algorithms. Indeed, such a
profile of algorithms determines a pure Nash equilibrium (PNE), a powerful solution concept which
rarely exists in games. An important question in this regard is whether such a profile exists. An
accompanying question is whether learning dynamics in which players may change their prediction
algorithms to better respond to others would converge. Therefore, we ask:
• Does a PNE exist?
• Will the players be able to find it efficiently with high probability using better-response
dynamics?
We prove that the answer to both questions is in the affirmative. We first show that when the
capacity of each strategy space is bounded (i.e., finite pseudo-dimension), players can learn payoffs
from samples. Namely, we show that the payoff function of each player uniformly converges over all
possible strategy profiles (that include strategies of the other players); thus, with high probability
a player’s payoff under any strategy profile is not too distant from her empirical payoff. Later,
we show that an empirical PNE always exists, i.e., a PNE of the game induced by the empirical
sample distribution. Moreover, we show that any learning dynamics in which players improve their
payoff by more than a non-negligible quantity converges fast to an approximate PNE. Using the two
latter results, we show an interesting property of the setting: the elementary idea of sampling and
better-responding according to the empirical distribution until convergence leads to an approximate
PNE of the game on the whole population. We analyze this learning process, and formalize the
above intuition via an algorithm that runs in polynomial time in the instance parameters, and
returns an approximate PNE with high probability.
To further exemplify the setting, we then consider the case of players employing linear regression.
We modify the algorithm of Ben-Porat and Tennenholtz [5], proposed for a related setting, to devise
an algorithm for the best linear response of a player. We conduct simulations on various synthetic
datasets to visualize the structure of PNEs in several settings, and to perform sensitivity analysis.
Finally, we discuss two extensions. We consider the case of infinite capacities, and demonstrate that
non-learnability can occur even if the user distribution is known to all players. We also study a
natural variant of the model, where each user grants one monetary unit to the most accurate player,
and show that learning and PNE existence are no longer guaranteed.
1.1 Related work
The intersection of research in game theory and machine learning has increased rapidly in recent
years. Sample empowered mechanism design is a fruitful line of research. For example, Cole and
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Roughgarden [8], Gonczarowski and Nisan [12], Morgenstern and Roughgarden [20] reconsider
auctions where the auctioneer can sample from bidder valuation functions, thereby relaxing the
assumption of prior knowledge on bidder valuation distribution [21]. Empirical distributions also
play a key role in other lines of research [1, 3, 16], where e.g. Babichenko et al. [3] show how to obtain
an approximate equilibrium by sampling any mixed equilibrium. The PAC-learning framework
proposed by Valiant [26] has also been extended by Blum et al. [6], who consider a collaborative
game where players attempt to learn the same underlying prediction function, but each player has
her own distribution over the space. In their work each player can sample from her own distribution,
and the goal is to use information sharing among the players to reduce the sample complexity.
Another line of work deals with extracting data from selfish agents for a variety of machine learning
tasks [7, 9, 18, 13]. We stress that these works are only parallel to this one, as in this paper there
are no strategic agents, only myopic users who follow the “best” prediction they get. Moreover, in
this work the strategic parties are those who provide the predictions, aiming at satisfying as many
users as possible.
Our work is inspired by Dueling Algorithms [15]. Immorlica et al. [15] analyze an optimization
problem from the perspective of competition, rather than from the point of view of a single optimizer.
That work examines the dueling form of several optimization problems, e.g., the shortest path
from the source vertex to the target vertex in a graph with random weights. While minimizing the
expected length is a probable solution concept for a single optimizer (i.e., socially optimal), this is no
longer the case in the defined duel. Our model is also related to Competing Bandits [17]. Mansour
et al. [17] consider a competition between two bandit algorithms faced with the same sample, where
users arrive one by one and choose between the two algorithms. This work is substantially different
than Mansour et al. [17]. To name a few differences, our work players also share the same sample
but we consider an offline setting and not an online one; infinite strategy spaces and not a finite
set of actions; context in the form of property vector for each user; and an arbitrary number of
asymmetric players, where asymmetry is reflected in the strategy space of each player.
Most relevant to our work is the work by Ben-Porat and Tennenholtz [5]. The authors present
a learning task where a newcomer agent is given a sequence of examples, and wishes to learn a
best-response to the players already on the market. They assume that the agent can sample triplets
composed of instance, label and current market prediction, and define the agent’s payoff as the
proportion of points (associated with users) she predicts better than the other players. Indeed,
Ben-Porat and Tennenholtz [5] introduce a learning task incorporating economic interpretation into
the objective function of the (single) optimizer, but in fact does not provide any game-theoretic
analysis. In contrast, this paper considers game-theoretic interaction between players, and its main
contribution lies in the analysis of such interactions. Since learning dynamics consists of steps of
unilateral deviations that improve the deviating player’s payoff, the Best Response Regression of
Ben-Porat and Tennenholtz [5] can be thought of as an initial step to this work.
1.2 Our contribution
Our contribution is three-fold. First, we explicitly suggest that prediction algorithms, like other
products on the market, are in competition. This novel view emphasizes the need for stability in
prediction-based competition similar to Hotelling’s stability in spatial competition [14].
Second, we introduce an extension of the PAC-learning framework for dealing with strategy
profiles, each of which is a sequence of functions. To illustrate why this is not an immediate
application of the PAC-learning framework, recall that in the PAC-learning framework we assume a
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loss function which quantifies how good or bad a hypothesis is, regardless of the hypothesis space.
In our games, however, a strategy profile cannot be determined to be good (being a PNE) or bad
(there exist beneficial deviations) by itself; we must as well consider all profiles and in particular the
possible beneficial deviations.
We show a reduction from payoff maximization to a single-player loss minimization setting,
which is later used to achieve bounds on the sample complexity for uniform convergence over the
set of profiles. We also show that when players have approximate better-response oracles, they can
learn an approximate PNE of the empirical game. The main technical contribution of this paper
is an algorithm which, given , δ, samples a polynomial number of points in the game instance
parameters, runs any -better-response dynamics, and returns an -PNE with probability of at least
1− δ.
Third, we consider games with at least one player with an infinite pseudo-dimension. We show a
game instance where each player can learn the best prediction function from her hypothesis class if
she were alone in the game, but a PNE of the empirical game is not generalized. This inability to
learn emphasizes that strategic behavior can introduce further challenges to the machine learning
community.
2 Problem definition
In this section we formalize the model. We begin with an informal introduction to elementary
concepts in both game theory and learning theory that are used throughout the paper.
Game theory A non-cooperative game is composed of a set of players N = {1, . . . , N}; a strategy
space Hi for every player i; and a payoff function pii : H1 × · · · × HN → R for every player
i. The set H = H1 × · · · × HN contains all possible strategy profiles, and a tuple of strategies
h = (h1, . . . hN ) ∈ H is called a strategy profile, or simply a profile. We denote by h−i the vector
obtained by omitting the i-th component of h.
A strategy h′i ∈ Hi is called a better response of player i with respect to a strategy profile h
if pii(h′i,h−i) > pii(h). Similarly, h′i is said to be an -better response of player i, w.r.t. a strategy
profile h if pii(h′i,h−i) ≥ pii(h) + , and a best response to h−i if pii(h′i,h−i) ≥ suphi∈Hi pii(hi,h−i) .
We say that a strategy profile h is a pure Nash equilibrium (herein denoted PNE) if every player
plays a best response under h. We say that a strategy profile h is an -PNE if no player has an
-better response under h, i.e., for every player i, it holds that pii(h) ≥ suph′i∈Hi pii(h′i,h−i)− .
Learning theory Let X be a set, and let F be a class of binary-valued functions F ⊆ {0, 1}X .
Given a sequence S = (x1, . . . xm) ∈ Xm, we denote the restriction of F to S by F ∩ S =
{(f(x1), . . . , f(xm)) | f ∈ F}. The growth function of F , denoted ΠF : N → N, is defined as
ΠF (m) = maxS∈Xm |F ∩ S|. We say that F shatters S if |F ∩ S| = 2|S|. The Vapnik-Chervonenkis
dimension of a binary function class is the cardinality of the largest set of points in X that can be
shattered by F , VCdim(F ) = max {m ∈ N : ΠF (m) = 2m}.
Let H be a class of real-valued functions H ⊆ RX . The restriction of H to S ∈ Xm is analogously
defined, H ∩ S = {(h(x1), . . . , h(xm)) | h ∈ H}. We say that H pseudo-shatters S if there exists
r = (r1, . . . , rm) ∈ Rm such that for every binary vector b = (b1, . . . bm) ∈ {−1, 1}m there exists
hb ∈ H and for every i ∈ [m] it holds that sign(hb(xi)− ri) = bi. The pseudo-dimension of H is the
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cardinality of the largest set of points in X that can be pseudo-shattered by H,
Pdim(H) = max {m ∈ N : ∃S ∈ Xm such that S is pseudo-shattered by H} .
2.1 Model
We consider a set of users who are interested in a prediction provided by a set of competing players.
Each user is associated with a vector (x, y, t), where x is the instance; y is the label; and t is the
threshold that the user is willing to accept.
The players offer predictions to the users. When a user associated with a vector (x, y, t)
approaches player i, she produces a prediction hi(x). If |hi(x)− y| is at most t, the user associated
with (x, y, t) will grant one monetary unit to player i. Otherwise, that user will move on to another
player. We assume that users approach players according to the uniform distribution, although our
model and results support any distribution over player orderings. Player i has a set of possible
strategies (prediction algorithms) Hi, from which she has to decide which one to use. Each player
aims to maximize her expected payoff, and will act strategically to do so.
Formally, the game is a tuple 〈Z,D,N ,H, pi〉 such that
1. Z is the examples domain Z = X × Y × T , where X ⊂ Rn is the instance domain; Y ⊂ R is
the label domain; and T ⊂ R≥0 is the tolerance domain.
2. D is a probability distribution over Z = X × Y × T .
3. N is the set of players, where N = [N ] def= {1, . . . , N}. A strategy of player i is an element
from Hi ⊆ YX . The space of all strategy profiles is denoted by H = ×Ni=1Hi.
4. For z = (x, y, t) and a function g : X → Y, we define the indicator I(z, g) to be 1 if the
distance between the value g predicted for x and y is at most t. Formally,
I(z, g) =
{
1 |g(x)− y| ≤ t
0 otherwise
.
5. Given a strategy profile h = (h1, . . . hN ) with hi ∈ Hi for i ∈ N and z = (x, y, t) ∈ Z, let
wi(z;h) =
0 if I(z, hi) = 01∑N
i′=1 I(z,hi′ )
otherwise .
Note that wi(z;h) represents the expected payoff of player i, w.r.t. the user associated with z.
The payoff of player i under h is the average sum over all users, and is defined by
pii(h) = Ez∼D [wi(z;h)] .
6. D is unknown to the players.
We assume players have access to a sequence of examples S, drawn i.i.d. from D. Given a game
instance 〈Z,D,N ,H, pi〉 and a sample S = {z1, . . . zm}, we denote by 〈Z,S ∼ Dm,N ,H, pi〉 the
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empirical game: the game over the same N ,H,Z and uniform distribution over the known S ∈ Zm.
We denote the payoff of player i in the empirical game by
piSi (h) = Ez∈S [wi(z;h)] =
1
m
m∑
j=1
wi(zj ;h). (1)
When S is known from the context, we occasionally use the term empirical PNE to denote a PNE
of the empirical game. Since the empirical game is a complete information game, players can use
the sample in order to optimize their payoffs.
The optimization problem of finding a best response in our model is intriguing in its own right.
Throughout the paper, we assume that each player i has a polynomial -better-response oracle.
Namely, given a real number  > 0, a strategy profile h and sample S, we assume that each player
i has an oracle that returns an -better response to h−i if such exists or answers false otherwise,
which runs in time poly(1 ,m,N). Despite that this assumption may be non-trivial in general cases,
we show in Section 4 such a best response oracle for the case of Hi being the class of linear functions
with constant input dimension (denoted by n in the model above). We also discuss situations where
a better response cannot be computed efficiently in Section 6, and present the applicability of our
model for these cases as well.
3 Meta algorithm and analysis
Throughout this section we assume that the pseudo-dimension of Hi is finite, and we denote it by di,
i.e., Pdim(Hi) = di <∞. Our goal is to propose a generic method for finding an -PNE efficiently.
The method is composed of two steps: first, it attains a sample of “sufficient” size. Afterwards,
it runs an -better-response dynamics until convergence, and returns the obtained profile. The
underlying idea is straightforward, but its analysis is non-trivial. In particular, we need to show two
main claims:
• Given a sufficiently large sample S, the payoff of each player i in the empirical game is not too
far away from her payoff in the actual game, with high probability. This holds concurrently
for all possible strategy profiles.
• An -PNE exists in every empirical game. Therefore, players can reach an -PNE of the
empirical game quickly, using their -better-response oracles.
These claims will be made explicit in forthcoming Subsections 3.1 and 3.2. We formalize the above
discussion via Algorithm 1 in Subsection 3.3.
3.1 Uniform convergence in probability
We now bound the probability (over all choices of S) of having player i’s payoff (for an arbitrary
i ∈ N ) greater or less than its empirical counterpart by more than . Notice that the restriction of
Hi to any arbitrary sample S, i.e., Hi ∩ S, may be of infinite size. Nevertheless, the payoff under
a strategy profile h ∈ H concerns the functions w1, . . . , wN only and not the actual real-valued
predictions produced by the players under h; hence, uniform convergence of another set of functions
should be argued, the class of functions that compose the payoff with the predictions.
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More formally, given z ∈ Z and h ∈ H, let w(z;h) = (w1(z;h), . . . , wN (z;h)), and denote by
W the class of functions from Z to {1, 12 , . . . , 1N , 0}N such that
W def== {w(z;h) | h ∈ H}. (2)
Notice that the set W ∩ S is finite. Moreover, for some z ∈ Z, w(z;h) = w(z;h′) may occur for
h 6= h′; thus, to argue that uniform convergence holds, one would typically show that the growth
function of W is polynomial. However, analyzing W directly seems tricky. To circumvent a direct
analysis of W , we define auxiliary classes of binary functions (Fi)i∈N . Let Fi be a class of functions
from Z to {0, 1} such that
Fi def= {I(z, h) | h ∈ Hi} . (3)
In the rest of this subsection, we prove properties of Fi and then associate those properties with the
payoffs of the game.
Observe that Fi is a binary function class, and thus its complexity can be quantified using the
VC dimension. On the other hand, we already know that the pseudo-dimension of Hi, which is a
real-valued function class, is di. The following combinatorial lemma bounds the VC dimension of
Fi as a function of the pseudo-dimension of Hi. By doing so, we present an interesting connection
between these two celebrated notations of expressive power of a space of functions (the VC dimension
and the pseudo-dimension).
Lemma 3.1. VCdim(Fi) ≤ 10di.
After discovering the connection between the growth rate of Hi and Fi, we can progress to
bounding the growth of the product function class F (which we will define shortly). For ease of
notation, denote I(z,h) = (I(z, h1), . . . , I(z, hN )). Let F be a class of functions from Z to {0, 1}N
defined by
F def=
N∏
i=1
Fi = {I (z,h) | h ∈ H} .
Note that every element in F is a function from Z to {0, 1}N . The restriction of F to a sample S is
naturally defined by
F ∩ S =
N∏
i=1
(Fi ∩ S) = {(I(z1,h), . . . , I(zm,h)) | h ∈ H} .
As a result,
|F ∩ S| =
N∏
i=1
|Fi ∩ S| . (4)
We use Equation (4) to characterize the growth function of F , defined by ΠF (m) = maxS∈Zm |F ∩ S|.
We bound ΠF (m) using Lemma 3.1 and the Sauer-Shelah lemma.
Lemma 3.2. ΠF (m) ≤ (em)10
∑N
i=1 di.
Before we claim for uniform convergence in probability, we must relate the number of distinct
profiles (i.e., elements in W∩S) in the empirical game under S and the size of F ∩S. The following
claim shows that the size of F ∩ S is an upper bound on the size of W ∩ S.
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Claim 3.3. It holds that ΠW(m) ≤ ΠF (m).
Next, we bound the probability of a player i’s payoff being “too far” from its empirical counterpart.
The proof of Lemma 3.4 below goes along the path of Vapnik and Chervonenkis [28]. Since in our
case F is not a binary function class, a few modifications are needed.
Lemma 3.4. Let m be a positive integer, and let  > 0. It holds that
Pr
S∼Dm
(
∃h :
∣∣∣pii(h)− piSi (h)∣∣∣ ≥ ) ≤ 4ΠW(2m)e− 2m8 .
The following theorem bounds the probability that any player i has a difference greater than 
between its payoff and its empirical payoff (over the selection of a sample S), uniformly over all
possible strategy profiles. This is done by simply applying the union bound on the bound already
obtained in Lemma 3.4.
Theorem 3.5. Let m be a positive integer, and let  > 0. It holds that
Pr
S∼Dm
(
∃i ∈ N : sup
h∈H
∣∣∣pii(h)− piSi (h)∣∣∣ ≥ 
)
≤ 4N(2em)10
∑N
i=1 die−
2m
8 . (5)
3.2 Existence of a PNE in empirical games
In the previous subsection we bounded the probability of a payoff vector being too far from its
counterpart in the empirical game. Notice, however, that this result implies nothing about the
existence of a PNE or an approximate PNE: for a fixed S, even if suph∈H
∣∣∣pii(h)− piSi (h)∣∣∣ <  holds
for every i, a player may still have a beneficial deviation. Therefore, the results of the previous
subsection are only meaningful if we show that there exists a PNE in the empirical game, which is
the goal of this subsection. We prove this existence using the notion of potential games [19].
A non-cooperative game is called a potential game if there exists a function Φ : H → R such
that for every strategy profile h = (h1, . . . , hN ) ∈ H and every i ∈ N , whenever player i switches
from hi to a strategy h′i ∈ Hi, the change in her payoff function equals the change in the potential
function, i.e.,
Φ(h′i,h−i)− Φ(hi,h−i) = pii(h′i,h−i)− pii(hi,h−i).
Theorem 3.6 ([19, 22]). Every potential game with a finite strategy space possesses at least one
PNE.
Obviously, in our setting the strategy space of a game instance 〈Z,D,N ,H, pi〉 is typically
infinite. Infinite potential games may also possess a PNE (as discussed in [19]), but in our case the
distribution D is approximated from samples and the empirical game is finite, so no stronger claims
are needed. Lemma 3.7 below shows that every empirical game is a potential game.
Lemma 3.7. Every empirical game 〈Z,S ∼ Dm,N ,H, pi〉 has a potential function.
As an immediate result of Theorem 3.6 and Lemma 3.7,
Corollary 3.8. Every empirical game 〈Z,S ∼ Dm,N ,H, pi〉 possesses at least one PNE.
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After establishing the existence of a PNE in the empirical game, we are interested in the rate with
which it can be “learnt”. More formally, we are interested in the convergence rate of the dynamics
between the players, where at every step one player deviates to one of her -better responses. Such
dynamics do not necessarily converge in general games, but do converge in potential games. By
examining the specific potential function in our class of (empirical) games, we can also bound the
number of steps until convergence.
Lemma 3.9. Let 〈Z,S ∼ Dm,N ,H, pi〉 be any empirical game instance. After at most O
(
logN

)
iterations of any -better-response dynamics, an -PNE of the empirical game is obtained.
Remark: Due to Equation (1), we know that any beneficial deviation improves the payoff of the
deviating player by at least 1mN ; hence, Lemma 3.9 suggests that an (exact) empirical PNE could
be obtained using at most O (mN logN) iterations of any 1mN -better-response dynamics.
3.3 Learning -PNE with high probability
In this subsection we leverage the results of the previous Subsections 3.1 and 3.2 to devise Algorithm
1, which runs in polynomial time and returns an approximate equilibrium with high probability.
More precisely, we show that Algorithm 1 returns an -PNE with probability of at least 1 − δ,
and has time complexity of poly
(
1
 ,m,N, log
(
1
δ
)
, d
)
. As in the previous subsections, we denote
d = ∑Ni=1 di.
First, we bound the required sample size. Using standard algebraic manipulations on Equation
(5), we obtain the following.
Lemma 3.10. Let , δ ∈ (0, 1), and let
m ≥ 320d
2
log
(160d
2
)
+ 160d log(2e)
2
+ 16
2
log
(4N
δ
)
. (6)
With probability of at least 1− δ over all possible samples S of size m, it holds that
∀i ∈ N : sup
h∈H
∣∣∣pii(h)− piSi (h)∣∣∣ < .
Given , δ, we denote by m,δ the minimal integer m satisfying Equation (6). Lemma 3.10 shows
that m,δ = O
(
d
2 log
(
d
2
)
+ 1
2 log
(
N
δ
))
are enough samples to have all empirical payoff vectors
-close to their theoretic counterpart coordinate-wise (i.e., in the L∞ norm), with a probability of
at least 1− δ.
Next, we bind an approximate PNE in the empirical game with an approximate PNE in the
(actual) game.
Lemma 3.11. Let m ≥ m 
4 ,δ
and let h be an 2 -PNE in 〈Z,S ∼ Dm,N ,H, pi〉. Then h is an
-PNE with probability of at least 1− δ.
Recall that Lemma 3.9 ensures that every O
(
logN

)
iterations of any -better-response dynamics
must converge to an -PNE of the empirical game. In each such iteration, a player calls her
approximate better-response oracle, which is assumed to run in poly(1 ,m,N) time. Altogether,
given  and δ, Algorithm 1 runs in poly
(
1
 , N, log
(
1
δ
)
, d
)
time, and returns an -PNE with
probability of at least 1− δ.
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ALGORITHM 1: Approximate PNE w.h.p. via better-response dynamics
Input: δ,  ∈ (0, 1)
Output: a strategy profile h
1 set m = m 
4 ,δ
// the minimal integer m satisfying Equation (6)
2 sample S from Dm
3 execute any 2 -better-response dynamics on the empirical game corresponding to S until convergence, and
obtain a strategy profile h that is an empirical 2 -PNE
4 return h
Corollary 3.12. Let 〈Z,D,N ,H, pi〉 be a game, , δ ∈ (0, 1), and let h be the output of Algorithm
1. With probability of at least 1− δ, h is an -PNE.
4 Linear Strategy Space
Linear regression is extensively studied in the statistics/machine learning literature, and hence we
find it the most appropriate use-case to examine in our competitive setting. In this section, we shall
assume Hi is the linear strategy space for an arbitrary i ∈ N . Formally, Hi is the function class
of all linear mappings from X ⊆ Rn to R. For ease of notation, we shall treat every hi ∈ Hi as a
vector in Rn that corresponds to the mapping x 7→ 〈hi, x〉 for x ∈ Rn. 3 Under this representation,
the class Hi can be referred to as Rn. We shall further assume that the dimension of the input n is
constant.
We first present an oracle for the best linear response. We describe informally how a player i
can compute a best response against any h−i, and then devise an algorithm that is inspired by the
one proposed in Ben-Porat and Tennenholtz [5]. Algorithm 3 finds a best linear response against
any strategies selected by the other players, not necessarily linear strategies, and would apply even
if the other players employ more sophisticated algorithms, e.g., neural networks. Algorithm 3 runs
in polynomial time in the size of the sample m. Afterwards, we apply Algorithm 1 along with the
best response oracle implemented in Algorithm 3 on several synthetic datasets in a two-player game
with linear strategies, and examine the equilibrium structure and properties.
4.1 A Polynomial Best-Response Oracle
Before we present the formal algorithm, we give a high-level intuition of how it works. Let S = (zj)mj=1
be an arbitrary sample, i ∈ N be an arbitrary player index, and h−i be arbitrary strategies of all
players but i. Denote by M the mapping hi 7→ w such that
M(hi) = (wi(z1,h−i, hi), . . . , wi(zm,h−i, hi)) .
Observe that M need not be onto, as not all vectors in {0, 1N , 2N , . . . 1}m may be in the image of
M , nor one-to-one, as M(hi) = M(h′i) for hi, h′i ∈ Hi, hi 6= h′i may occur. In addition, the payoff
of player i under hi is precisely ‖M(hi)‖1. While the size of the target set of M is exponential
in m, Lemma 3.1 implies that the size of the image of M is only polynomial in m. The idea
3We shall keep using non-bold notation for single strategies and input vectors, to distinguish between those and
strategy profiles.
11
ALGORITHM 2: Partial Vector Feasibility (PVF)
Input: a sequence of examples S = (xj , yj , tj)mj=1, and a vector v ∈ {1, a, b, 0}m.
Output: a strategy hi ∈ Rn satisfying
• if vj = 1, then |〈hi, xj〉 − yj | ≤ tj // I(zj , hi) = 1
• if vj = a, then 〈hi, xj〉 − yj > tj // above
• if vj = b, then 〈hi, xj〉 − yj < −tj // below
• if vj = 0, there is no constraint for the j’th point
if such exists, and φ otherwise.
is therefore to do an exhaustive search over the image of M in polynomial time, find a vector
w∗ ∈ arg maxw∈Image(M) ‖w‖1, and then find h∗i ∈ Hi such that M(h∗i ) = w∗.
Next, we introduce an auxiliary decision problem that facilitates the search over the image of
M , the Partial Vector Feasibility problem (PVF). For every strategy hi ∈ Hi and a point (x, y, t),
we focus on the term |〈hi, x〉 − y|. In case it is less or equal to t, player i will get (some fraction) of
this point. Otherwise, she will not, and two cases can occur: either 〈hi, x〉 − y is greater than t
(above t), or 〈hi, x〉 − y is less than −t (below t). A PVF problem is a decision problem that asks
whether a partial set of the points can be classified into a particular assignment of these three cases;
it is formally defined in Algorithm 2.
Note that PVF is solvable in polynomial time via linear programming. We are now ready to
present the Best Linear Response (BLR) algorithm. BLR has three main steps:
1. Compute the possible gain from each point in the sample. The possible gain from each point
is a function of h−i.
2. Find all feasible subsets of points player i can satisfy concurrently (i.e., vectors in Fi ∩ S,
where Fi is as defined in Equation (3)).
3. Return a strategy that achieves the highest possible payoff.
The first step consists of a straightforward computation. To motivate the second step, notice
that if I(zj , hi) = 0, then either 〈hi, xj〉−yj > tj or 〈hi, xj〉−yj < −tj holds. Therefore, we identify
all vectors v = (v1, . . . vm) ∈ {1, a, b}m such that there exists hi ∈ Hi and vj = 1 if I(zj , hi) = 1;
vj = a if 〈hi, xj〉 − yj > tj (“above”); and vj = b if 〈hi, xj〉 − yj < −tj (“below”). This is done by
recursively partitioning {1, a, b}m, where in each iteration we consider only a prefix of the entries,
while the suffix is masked with “0” (see PVF). At the end of this step, we have fully identified the
set Fi ∩ S, since every vector in {1, a, b}m can be mapped to a vector in Fi ∩ S by replacing a, b
with 0. Due to the bijection between Fi ∩ S and the image of M (see Subsection 3.1), we have
essentially discovered the image of M ; thus, we can pick a feasible vector that corresponds to the
highest payoff. Finally, we find a strategy that attains the highest payoff by invoking PVF for the
last time. The above discussion is formulated via Algorithm 3.
Recall that we assume that the input space n is constant. Ben-Porat and Tennenholtz [5] show
that the second step (the for loop in line 4) is done in time poly(m), and that Rm is of polynomial
size. The first step (line 1) and the last step (lines 10 and 11) are clearly executed in polynomial
time. Overall, Algorithm 3 runs in polynomial time. In addition, since it considers all possible
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ALGORITHM 3: Best Linear Response (BLR)
Input: S = (xj , yj , tj)mj=1, h−i
Output: A best response to h−i
1 for every j ∈ [m], wj ← 1∑
i′ 6=i I(zj ,hi′ )+1
// player i can get up to wj for zj
2 v ← {0}m // v = (v1, v2, . . . , vm)
3 R0 ← {v}
4 for j = 1 to m do
5 Rj ← ∅
6 for v ∈ Rj−1 do
7 for α ∈ {1, a, b} do
8 if PVF (S, (v−j , α)) 6= φ then
9 add (v−j , α) to Rj // (v−j , α) = (v1, . . . vj−1, α, vj+1, . . . , vm)
10 v∗ ← arg maxv∈Rm
∑m
j=1 wj1vj=1
11 return PVF(S,v∗)
distinct strategies using Fi ∩ S and takes the one with the highest payoff, it indeed returns the best
linear response with respect to h−i in the empirical game. To sum,
Theorem 4.1. Let Hi be the linear strategy space, H−i be the product of any strategy spaces,
h−i be an element from H−i and let S be a sample of size m. Algorithm 3 finds h∗i such that
h∗i ∈ arg maxhi∈Hi piSi (h) in time poly(m).
We note that the best response need not be unique, as Algorithm 3 employs two tie breakers.
The first tie breaker is the selection of a feasible vector v∗ with the highest payoff in Line 10, since
several such vectors may exist. Second, the call PVF(S,v∗) in Line 11 returns a single strategy,
albeit the linear program it solves probably possesses infinitely many optimal solutions.
4.2 Simulations with Synthetic Data in R2
The goal of this subsection is to visualize equilibrium profiles in several scenarios, and analyze the
implications of different tolerance levels on the equilibrium structure. In service of that, we focus
on two-player games with X × Y = R2, and the linear strategy space for both players. Recall that
an equilibrium profile can be obtained by executing Algorithm 1, where Algorithm 3 plays the
role of a best response (which is a special case of -better response). Since our main purpose is to
discuss the structure of equilibria, we focus solely on the empirical games and completely neglect
the generalization analysis. Note, however, that the results obtained in the previous sections suggest
that the payoffs in equilibrium will be similar to their empirical counterparts.
We now describe the high-level details of the synthetic datasets we employ. We let the instance
x be uniformly distributed in a close segment. In addition, we consider four conditions for the
relations between the instance x and the value y:
1. Linear: for every instance x, its value y is a linear function of x, plus an additive normal noise.
Namely, y = ax+ b+  for a, b ∈ R and  ∼ Normal(0, 1). 4
2. V-shape: the value of every x is determined by y = a |x− x0| + b +  for x0, a, b ∈ R and
 ∼ Normal(0, 1).
4a and b are not related to the arbitrary numbers used in Algorithm 2.
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Figure 2: Visualization of the synthetic datasets we employ. Each sub-figure represents one condition,
and the points are realized values drawn from the distribution defined on X ×Y per condition. The
line is the linear least squares, a canonical prediction algorithm in statistics/machine learning.
3. X-shape: for every instance x, the value y is distributed as follows:
y =
{
a1x+ b1 +  w.p. 12
a2x+ b2 +  w.p. 12
,
where a1, b1, a2, b2 ∈ R and  ∼ Normal(0, 1).
4. Piecewise: for every x, the value y is given by
y =
{
a1x+ b1 +  if x ≤ x0
a2x+ b2 +  else
,
where x0, a1, b1, a2, b2 ∈ R and  ∼ Normal(0, 1).
We have so far described the distribution over X × Y for all four conditions. A visualization
of generated datasets according to these conditions appears in Figure 2. To complete a game
description, we need to specify the tolerance levels. Different tolerance levels alter the equilibrium
behavior, and thus are interesting to explore. In these simulations, we use a constant tolerance level,
i.e., given a set (xj , yj)mj=1 associated with one of the four conditions above and a value t ∈ R, the
dataset we analyze is (xj , yj , t)mj=1. By doing so, we do not exploit the full generality of the model
and algorithms. Nevertheless, since the tolerance levels are non-obvious to simulate, we feel that
this is justified. To examine the extent to which the payoffs are sensitive to the tolerance levels, we
consider three levels of tolerance, which vary across the four conditions above.
We generated5 12 datasets, composed of the four conditions and three tolerance levels for each
condition. For each dataset, we run Algorithm 1, with Algorithm 3 playing the role of a best
response oracle, until convergence and observed the obtained equilibrium profile.
Our findings are reported in Figure 3. Each column of sub-figures corresponds to one of the
four conditions above. The rows correspond to tolerance levels in a decreasing order. For instance,
the top leftmost sub-figure represents the linear condition with high tolerance level. The colored
lines are the strategies of the players in a PNE profile, as obtained by Algorithm 1. A point is
circled-red (square-blue) if only the dashed-red (solid-blue) player produces an accurate prediction
5The specifics are elaborated in Section D. Our code is available at: https://github.com/omerbp/
Regression-Equilibrium.
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Figure 3: Visualization of equilibrium profiles per condition and tolerance level. Each column of
sub-figures is associated with one of the four conditions, and each row with one tolerance level.
For example, the bottom rightmost sub-figure corresponds to the piecewise condition with low
tolerance level. The players’ strategies are the lines, and each point in the dataset is colored and
patterned according to the player who obtains it. Namely, a point is circle-red (square-blue) if
only the dashed-red (solid-blue) player predicts it accurately, in terms of the tolerance. A point is
star-green if both players predicted it accurately, and x-black if both predictions are inaccurate.
for it. Alternatively, a point is star-green if both players produce an accurate prediction for it, and
x-black if both predictions are inaccurate (i.e., point j is black |hi(xj)− yj | > t for i ∈ {1, 2} and
the corresponding tolerance level t).
Observe that the players’ strategies are distinguishable, even for the linear condition. Noticeably,
the number of star-green points decreases with the tolerance level. It symbolizes that the number of
points obtaining an accurate prediction from both players decreases with the tolerance. In contrast,
the number of x-black points increases with the tolerance, as less points get an accurate prediction
when the tolerance is low. Moreover, notice that a high tolerance allows the players to gain almost
all points, but when the tolerance is low roughly half of the points obtain an inaccurate prediction.
As for player payoffs, the two players get almost the same payoff in all datasets, albeit theoretically
the payoffs may greatly differ; this is due to the symmetric nature of the datasets.
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5 Extensions
In this section we answer two interesting questions. First, in Subsection 5.1, we deal with an infinite
pseudo-dimension. While we show learning may not occur, similarly to other machine learning
applications (see, e.g., [24]), we obtain this result even if the players fully observe D. This conclusion
is in sheer contrast to classical results, since when D is observed there is essentially nothing to learn.
In our setting, however, equilibrium strategy is another object that has to be learned. Second, we
analyze a variant of the model that is aligned with the payoff function of Ben-Porat and Tennenholtz
[5] and Immorlica et al. [15], Namely, where each user (associated with an example) grants one
monetary unit to the player who provides the most accurate prediction. Unlike the existence we
proved in Subsection 3.2 for the main model, under this variant an empirical PNE may not exist.
5.1 Learnability in games with infinite dimension
While Lemma 3.1 upper bounds the VC dimension of Fi, the following Claim 5.1 puts a lower bound
on it. Claim 5.1 implies that if Pdim(Hi) is infinite, so is VCdim(Fi).
Claim 5.1. VCdim(Fi) ≥ Pdim(Hi).
Classical results in learning theory suggest that if VCdim(Fi) = ∞, a best response on the
sample may not generalize to an approximate best response w.h.p. To see this, imagine a “game”
with one player, who seeks to maximize her payoff function. No Free Lunch Theorems (see, e.g.,
[29]) imply that with a constant probability, the player cannot get her payoff within a constant
distance from the optimal payoff. We conclude that in general games, if a player has a strategy
space with an infinite pseudo-dimension, she may not be able to learn. However, in the presence of
such a player, can other players with a finite pseudo-dimension learn an approximate best-response?
In our setting, players are interacting with each other, and player payoffs are a function of the whole
strategy profile; thus, different challenges may arise.
The strategy space of a player i in an empirical game induced by a sample S is Hi ∩ S, namely
the restriction of her strategy space to the sample. Due to the structure of the payoff function,
player i can compute an empirical best response to h−i ∩ S without knowing h−i nor H−i. As
the sample size increases S becomes a representative of D, and we employed uniform convergence
to conclude that w.h.p. H ∩ S is “similar” to H; hence, players use the sample to learn both the
underline distribution and a best response to the other players. In the rest of this subsection we give
an example where knowledge about the strategy spaces of the other players is crucial. In particular,
we show that if player i (for i = 1) has a strategy space with infinite dimension, she can trick the
other players and drive them to her preferable outcome.
Example 5.1. Let D be a density function over Z = [0, 2]× [0, 1]×
{
1
2
}
as follows:
D(x, y, t) =

1
2 0 ≤ x < 1, y = 0, t = 12
1
2 1 ≤ x ≤ 2, y = 1, t = 12
0 otherwise
.
We now define several strategies that will constitute the strategy spaces. Let h0(x) ≡ 0, h1(x) ≡ 1
be constant functions mapping each instance x to 0, 1 correspondingly. Moreover, for any S ⊂ Z,
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denote
hS→0(x) =
{
0 ∃y, t : (x, y, t) ∈ S
11≤x≤2 ∀y, t : (x, y, t) /∈ S
, hS→1(x) =
{
1 ∃y, t : (x, y, t) ∈ S
11≤x≤2 ∀y, t : (x, y, t) /∈ S
.
In other words, hS→0 labels 0 (and hS→1 labels 1) every instance x that appears in the projection
of S on its first entry; otherwise, it labels it correctly according to D, i.e., hS→0(x) = 11≤x≤2 (and
similarly, hS→1(x) = 11≤x≤2). Let N = {1, 2, 3}, H2 = H3 = {h0, h1}, and denote
H1 = {hS→0 | S ⊂ Z} ∪ {hS→1 | S ⊂ Z} ∪ {h0, h1}.
Notice that H1 is “complex”, i.e., Pdim(H1) = ∞. Next, we define a game G such that G =
〈Z,D,N ,H, pi〉 for H = H1 ×H2 ×H3. Denote by h the strategy profile h = (hS→0, h1, h1), and
by h′ the strategy profile h′ = (h0, h1, h1). Observe that pi1(h) = 23 , pi2(h) = pi3(h) =
1
6 , while
pi1(h′) = 12 , pi2(h
′) = pi3(h′) = 14 . Moreover, hS→0 is a best response of player 1 to h−1, while h1 is
a best response of player 2 to h′−2 (similarly for player 3). As a result, player 1 would like to play
hS→0 against h−1, but let player 2 and 3 think she plays h0 and therefore mislead them to assume
that playing h1 (as they do under h′) is a best response.
Since h0 and hS→0 coincide on every sample S, players 2 and 3 cannot distinguish between h and
h′ by observing the empirical payoffs. Moreover, with probability of at least 14 over all choices of S
for |S| ≥ 15 we have 12 < 1m
∑m
j=1 1yj=1 <
3
4 (see Claim C.2 in the appendix). Under such a sample
S, player 2 and 3 indeed play a best response under h′ in the empirical game induced by S (while
player 1 is not). Consequently, their lack of knowledge about H1 forbids them to better-respond to
player 1 and leads them to sub-optimal payoffs (each gets 16 compared to
1
4 if she deviates) with
constant probability. By playing hS→0, which is sub-optimal in the empirical game of G on such S
(since piS1 (h∅→0,h−1)− piS1 (h) > 13), player 1 can manipulate the others to think that she plays h0.
The intuition behind the example is as follows. Despite D being relatively simple, the strategy
selected by player 1 is “complex”, in the sense that its behavior on the sample and on the population
is substantially different; thus, players 2 and 3 are only playing a best response to the observable,
simple way player 1 is playing on the sample, yet misinterpret the extension of player 1’s strategy
to the population. The results of the previous sections imply that this phenomena cannot occur
when the pseudo dimensions are finite, as long as the sample is large enough. Another interesting
point is that in Example 5.1 each player can find a strategy that maximizes her payoff if she were
alone using a small number of samples. Indeed, this inability to generalize from samples follows
solely from strategic behavior. Notice that if player 2 has knowledge of H1, she can infer that her
strategy under h′ is sub-optimal. However, knowledge of the strategy spaces of other players is a
heavy assumption: the better-response dynamics we discussed in Subsection 3.2 only assumed that
each player can compute a better response.
5.2 Non-existence of PNE in the Direct Attraction Model
In this subsection we consider a variant of the model, where a player payoff is the proportion of
users for whom she provides the most accurate prediction. Notice that this payoff scheme is aligned
with the one considered by Immorlica et al. [15]. We show a negative result for this payoff scheme –
a PNE may not exist without further assumptions on D. Surprisingly, this is true even when players
are restricted to linear strategies. Finally, we highlight a special case where a PNE does exist. To
facilitate understanding, we denote the elements we reconsider in this subsection by a tilde.
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First, we formalized the payoff scheme considered in this subsection. Let Z˜ = X × Y, D˜ be
the marginal distribution of D over Z˜ and let S˜ denote a sample from Z˜. Given z˜ = (x, y) ∈ Z˜
and a strategy profile h, Denote by B(z˜;h) the number of players who provide the most accurate
prediction. In other words,
B(z˜;h) =
{
i ∈ N : |hi(x)− y| ≤ min
i′∈N
|hi′(x)− y|
}
. (7)
In addition, let
w˜i(z˜;h) =

1
|B(z˜;h)| i ∈ B(z˜;h)
0 otherwise
.
Finally, the payoffs and the empirical payoffs are defined by
p˜ii(h) = Ez˜∼D˜ [w˜i(z˜;h)] , p˜i
S
i (h) = Ez∈S˜ [w˜i(z˜;h)] . (8)
Indeed, this payoff depicts the case where each user is attracted to the player (or some, if there
is more than one) that offered her the most accurate prediction. The induced game is a constant
sum game, as now every user (or a point in Z˜) grants a monetary unit to one of the players w.p. 1.
Moreover, notice that the third entry of Z, the tolerance, is completely disregarded in this payoff
scheme.
Recall that in Section 3 we have demonstrated that players can use a sample drawn i.i.d. to
learn an approximate PNE with high probability. However, as we show next, under the revised
payoff scheme a PNE may not exist.
Proposition 5.2. A game 〈Z˜, D˜,N ,H, p˜i〉 may not possess an approximate PNE for a constant
approximation factor.
Proposition 5.2 implies that under the payoff scheme defined in Equation (8), players may not
learn an -PNE from a sample, regardless of the sample size. We prove Proposition 5.2 by providing
a special case, which is given in Example 5.2.
Example 5.2. Let Z˜ ⊂ R2, and let U ⊂ Z˜ be a union of squares as follows:
U
def= ([0, 1]× [1, 2]) ∪ ([1, 2]× [0, 1]) ∪ ([2, 3]× [1, 2]) .
See Figure 4 for illustration. Let D˜ be the uniform distribution over U , let N = 2 (i.e., a two-player
game) and let H1 = H2 be the linear strategy space. Observe that
Claim 5.3. There exists no
(
1
6 − 
)
-PNE in 〈Z˜, D˜,N ,H, p˜i〉, for any arbitrarily small constant  > 0.
The above Claim 5.3 proves Proposition 5.2.
In fact, it is not immediate that the game proposed in Example 5.2 even possesses a mixed
Nash equilibrium, despite being a symmetric zero-sum two-player game. Observe that not only the
strategy space of the players is infinite, but also player payoffs are discontinuous, so Glicksberg’s
theorem [11] cannot be applied. Since this work focuses on pure strategy profiles, we leave the full
analysis of this extension for future work.
Before the end of this section, we highlight a class of games that do possess a PNE. The setting
depicted in Example 5.2 is carefully crafted to demonstrate the negative effects of p˜i as defined in
Equation (8). Arguably, linear strategies are bad predictors for the structure of the data in this
example, which is highly non-linear. One may ask whether a PNE must exist in the realizable case.
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Figure 4: The distribution D˜ is the uniform distribution on the filled squares. As suggested by
Claim 5.3, for any selection of two linear functions, one of the players will have a beneficial deviation
granting her at least 23 − , for any arbitrarily small  > 0.
ALGORITHM 4: Approximate PNE w.h.p. for the realizable case
Input: δ,  ∈ (0, 1)
Output: a strategy profile h
1 set m = m 
2 ,δ
// the minimal integer m satisfying Equation (6)
2 sample S˜ from D˜m
3 for every i ∈ N , find hi such that
∑
(x,y)∈S˜ 1hi(x)6=y = 0
4 return h = (h1, . . . , hN )
Definition 5.1. A game 〈Z˜, D˜,N ,H, p˜i〉 is realizable if for every i ∈ N and (x, y) ∈ Z˜ there exists
h∗i such that h∗i (x) = y.
In a realizable game, every player has a strategy that predicts the label of every instance correctly.
Clearly, (h∗1, . . . , h∗N ) is a PNE of the game, and so at least one PNE exists. We now show that an
approximate PNE of a realizable game can be found using the technique we developed in Section
3. Given , δ, let m = m 
2 ,δ
that satisfies Equation (6), and let S˜ be a sample of size m from D˜.
Due to the realizability assumption, every player i has a strategy that accurately predicts the value
of every instance in the sample; let hi be one such strategy (this does not imply that hi = h∗i ).
Importantly, hi can be found using the same best response oracle employed earlier in Algorithm
1, when augmenting every point in S˜ to have 0 in its third entry (i.e., zero tolerance). The above
discussion is formalized via Algorithm 4. We show that it outputs an -PNE with probability of at
least 1− δ.
Lemma 5.4. Let 〈Z˜, D˜m,N ,H, p˜i〉 be a realizable game, , δ ∈ (0, 1), and let h be the output of
Algorithm 4. With probability of at least 1− δ, h is an -PNE.
6 Discussion
We have presented a novel setting that deepens the intersection between learning theory and game
theory. We used the seminal framework of Valiant to model an environment where users seek
predictions and players provide them, where players’ payoffs are defined in the spirit of Dueling
Algorithms [15]. We proved the existence of a PNE, bounded the number of steps until convergence
and formalized an algorithm that computes a PNE assuming better-response oracles. We provided
19
an oracle for linear strategy space, and demonstrated the equilibrium structure for linear two-player
games in several settings. We have also considered cases where players cannot learn a PNE, despite
that user distribution is fully known, and provided preliminary results on an interesting variant of
the model, which will appear in future work.
As mentioned in Section 2.1, our analysis assumes players have better-response oracles. In fact,
our model and results are valid for a much more general scenario, as described next. Consider
the case where players only have heuristics for finding a better response. After running heuristic
better-response dynamics and obtaining a strategy profile, the uniform convergence property implies
that the payoffs with respect to the whole population are guaranteed to be close to their empirical
counterparts, w.h.p.; therefore, our analysis is still meaningful even if players cannot maximize their
empirical payoff efficiently. The bounds on the required sample size we obtained in Section 3 and
the rate of convergence are relevant for this case as well.
Ultimately, we remark that regression equilibrium can be employed to develop piece-wise linear
models, or other mixture models in general, as illustrated in Subsection 4.2 and Figure 3. This is a
future direction of independent interest.
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A Proof of Lemma 3.1
Proof of Lemma 3.1. First, we define two auxiliary classes of binary functions G≥,G≤ such that
G≥ = {g≥h (x, r) = 1h(x)≥r | h ∈ Hi, (x, r) ∈ X × R},
G≤ = {g≤h (x, r) = 1h(x)≤r | h ∈ Hi, (x, r) ∈ X × R}. (9)
Claim A.1. VCdim(G≥) = VCdim(G≤) = di.
The proof of Claim A.1 appears after the proof of this lemma. Next, we wish to bound the
growth function of Fi using the growth function of G≥ and G≤.
Claim A.2. ΠFi(m) ≤ ΠG≥(m) ·ΠG≤(m).
The proof of Claim A.2 appears after the proof of this lemma. We are now ready for the final
argument. By the Sauer-Shelah lemma we know that every m satisfying 2m > ΠFi(m) is an upper
bound on VCdim(Fi) [23]. In particular, for m = 10di we have
25di = (31 + 1)di =
di∑
j=0
31j1di−j
(
di
j
)
Claim A.3≥
di∑
j=0
(31di
j
)j
(10)
>
di∑
j=0
(10edi
j
)j Claim A.3≥ di∑
j=0
(
10di
j
)
≥ ΠG≥(10di) = ΠG≤(10di); (11)
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therefore,
ΠFi(10di) ≤ ΠG≥(10di)ΠG≤(10di) < 210di .
Proof of Claim A.1. We prove the claim for G≥, and by symmetric arguments one can show it
holds for G≤ as well.
Since Pdim(Hi) = di, for every m ≤ di there is a sample S = (x1, . . . xm) ∈ Xm and a witness
r = (r1, . . . rm) ∈ Rm such that for every binary vector b ∈ {−1, 1}m there is a function hb for
which sign(hb(xj)− rj) = bj for all j ∈ [m]. Denote
S ′ = ((x1, r1), . . . , (xm, rm)) ,
and focus on a particular b ∈ {−1, 1}m. For every j ∈ [m] such that bj = 1 we have
sign(hb(xj)− rj) = 1⇒ hb(xj)− rj > 0⇒ 1hb(x)≥r(xj , rj) = 1.
In addition, if bj = −1 then
sign(hb(xj)− rj) = −1⇒ hb(xj)− rj < 0⇒ 1hb(x)≥r(xj , rj) = 0.
This is true for every b; therefore, we showed that G≥ shatters S ′.
In the opposite direction, assume by contradiction that G≥ shatters S ′ = ((x1, r1), . . . , (xm, rm))
for m ≥ di + 1. Let H = {hb}b∈{−1,1} ⊂ Hi be a set of functions such that for every b there exists
exactly one function hb ∈ H satisfying 1hb(x)≥r(xj , rj) = 1 if bj = 1 and 1hb(x)≥r(xj , rj) = 0 if
bj = 0. Notice that by definition of the VC dimension, such an H must exist, and that |H| = 2m.
One cannot claim directly that Hi pseudo-shatters S = (x1, . . . , xm) with witness r = (r1, . . . rm),
since hb(xj) = rj may hold for bj = 1, but we need hb(xj) to be strictly greater than rj ; therefore,
we construct a new witness: let aj be such that
aj = max
hb∈H,bj=−1
hb(xj).
Notice that |H| is finite so the maximum is well defined. In addition, aj < rj since hb(xj) < rj for
every b such that bj = −1 (recall that if bj = 0 then 1hb(x)≥r(xj , rj) = 0 ).
Denote r∗ = a+r2 . Next, we claim that Hi pseudo-shatters S with the witness r∗. Fix
b ∈ {−1, 1}m. If bj = −1,
1hb(x)≥r(xj , rj) = 0⇒ hb(xj) ≤ aj ⇒ hb(xj) < r∗j ⇒ 1hb(x)≥r(xj , r∗j ) = 0.
On the other hand, if bj = 1, we have
1hb(x)≥r(xj , rj) = 1⇒ hb(xj) ≥ rj ⇒ hb(xj) > r∗j ⇒ 1hb(x)≥r(xj , r∗j ) = 1.
Combining these two equations, we get that sign(hb(xj)− r∗j ) = bj for all j ∈ [m]. Consequently,
Hi pseudo-shatters S with witness r∗; hence we obtained a contradiction.
Overall, we showed that VCdim(G≥) ≥ di and VCdim(G≥) ≤ di; hence VCdim(G≥) = di.
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Proof of Claim A.2. Denote by S = (xj , yj , tj)mj=1 ∈ Zm an arbitrary sample, and let Fi ∩ S be
the restriction of Fi to S. Formally,
Fi ∩ S = {(fh(z1), . . . , fh(zm)) | fh ∈ Fi} .
In addition, denote by G≥ the restriction of G≥ to (xj , yj − tj)mj=1, and similarly let G≤ be the
restriction of G≤ to (xj , yj + tj)mj=1. We now show a one-to-one mapping M : Fi ∩ S → G≥ ×G≤,
implying that
|Fi ∩ S| ≤
∣∣∣G≥ ×G≤∣∣∣ (12)
holds, thereby proving the assertion. Notice that for every fh ∈ Fi such that fh(z) = 1 we have
I(z, h) = 1 for the corresponding h ∈ Hi; thus
− tj ≤ h(xj)− yj ≤ tj ⇒
{
1h(xj)≤yj+tj = 1
1h(xj)≥yj−tj = 1
⇒
{
g≤h (xj , yj + tj) = 1
g≥h (xj , yj − tj) = 1
.6 (13)
Alternatively, if fh(zj) = 0, we have I(zj , h) = 0 and
(h(xj)− yj < −tj) ∨ (h(xj)− yj > tj)⇒ (1h(xj)<yj−tj = 1) ∨ (1h(xj)>yj+tj = 1)
⇒ (1h(xj)≥yj−tj = 0) ∨ (1h(xj)≤yj+tj = 0)⇒ (g≥h (xj , yj − tj) = 0) ∨ (g≤h (xj , yj + tj) = 0). (14)
By Equations (13) and (14) we have{
fh(zj) = 1⇒ (g≤h (xj , yj + tj), g≥h (xj , yj − tj)) = (1, 1)
fh(zj) = 0⇒ (g≤h (xj , yj + tj), g≥h (xj , yj − tj)) ∈ {(0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 0)}
. (15)
We define the mapping M such that every vector (I(z1, h1), . . . , I(zm, h1)) ∈ Fi ∩ S is mapped to(
g≥h (x1, y1 − t1), . . . , g≥h (xm, ym − tm), g≤h (x1, y1 + t1), . . . , g≤h (xm, ym + tm)
)
∈ G≥ ×G≤.
Namely, every vector obtained by applying fh on the sample S is mapped to the vector formed by
concatenating the two corresponding (same h) vectors from G≤ and G≥. Let b1, b2 ∈ Fi ∩ S such
that b1j 6= b2j for at least one index j ∈ [m], and w.l.o.g. let b1j = 1. Since b1j = fh(zj) = I(zj , h),
Equation (15) implies that M(b1)j = M(b1)j+m = 1, while at least one of {M(b2)j ,M(b2)j+m}
equals zero; thus M(b1) 6= M(b2). Hence M is an injection.
Ultimately, notice that S is arbitrary; thus
ΠFi(m) = maxS∈Zm |Fi ∩ S| ≤
∣∣∣G≥ ×G≤∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣G≥∣∣∣ · ∣∣∣G≤∣∣∣ ≤ ΠG≥(m) ·ΠG≤(m).
Claim A.3.
(
n
k
)k ≤ (nk) ≤ ( enk )k.
6Recall the definition of g≤h , g
≥
h in Equation (9).
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Proof of Claim A.3. We prove the two claims separately.
• (nk )k ≤ (nk): fix n. We prove by induction for k ≤ n. The assertion holds for k = 1. For k ≥ 2
and every m such that 0 < m < k ≤ we have
k ≤ n⇒ m
n
≤ m
k
⇒ 1− m
k
≤ 1− m
n
⇒ k −m
k
≤ n−m
n
⇒ n
k
≤ n−m
k −m ;
thus (
n
k
)k
= n
k
· · · n
k
≤ n
k
n− 1
k − 1 · · ·
n− k + 1
k − k + 1 =
(
n
k
)
.
• (nk) ≤ ( enk )k: since ek = ∑∞i=0 kii! (the Taylor expansion of ek), we have ek > kkk! ; thus, 1k! < ( ek )k.
As a result, (
n
k
)
= n · (n− 1) · · · (n− k + 1)
k! ≤
nk
k! <
(
en
k
)k
.
B Omitted proofs
Proof of Lemma 3.2. Recall that the Sauer-Shelah lemma implies that ΠFi(m) ≤ (em/di)di for
m > di + 1. Since |F ∩ S| = ∏Ni=1 |Fi ∩ S|, we have
ΠF (m) ≤
N∏
i=1
ΠFi(m) ≤
N∏
i=1
(em/di)10di ≤
N∏
i=1
(em)10di = (em)10
∑N
i=1 di .
Proof of Claim 3.3. To prove the claim, we show a one-to-one function from W ∩S to F ∩S for
any arbitrary S. In particular, it is sufficient to show a mapping w(z;h) 7→ I(z,h). Let M be a
mapping from {1, 12 , . . . , 1N , 0}N to {0, 1}N defined by
M(v) =
{
0 if ‖v‖1 = 0
‖v‖0 v otherwise
.
For instance, if N = 4 and v = (12 ,
1
2 , 0, 0), then M(v) = (1, 1, 0, 0). Clearly, M is a one-to-one
mapping from Image(w(z;h)) to Image(I(z,h)). For every vector w ∈ W ∩S, there exists hw ∈ H
such that
w = (w(z1;hw), . . . , w(zm;hw)).
By applying M on every entry of w, we obtain v such that
v = (I(z1;hw), . . . , I(zm;hw)).
Ultimately, since hw ∈ H, we conclude that v ∈ F ∩ S.
In fact, by considering M−1, M−1 : {0, 1}N → {1, 12 , . . . , 1N , 0}N such that for every u ∈ {0, 1}N ,
M−1(u) =
0 if ‖u‖ = 0u‖u‖1 otherwise ,
one can show that ΠF (m) ≤ ΠW(m) holds as well; therefore, ΠW(m) = ΠF (m).
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Proof of Lemma 3.4. The proof follows closely the four steps in the proof of the classical uniform
convergence theorem for binary functions (see, e.g., [2, 27]). The only steps that need modification
are Steps 3 and 4, but we present the full proof for completeness.
Step 1 – Symmetrization: First, we want to show that
Pr
S∼Dm
(
∃h :
∣∣∣pii(h)− piSi (h)∣∣∣ ≥ ) ≤ 2 Pr(S,S′)∼Dm
(
∃h :
∣∣∣piSi (h)− piS′i (h)∣∣∣ ≥ 2
)
. (16)
For each S, let h˜(S) be a function for which
∣∣∣pii(h˜(S))− piSi (h˜(S))∣∣∣ ≥  if such a function
exists, and any other fixed function in H otherwise. Notice that if
∣∣∣pii(h˜(S))− piSi (h˜(S))∣∣∣ ≥  and∣∣∣pii(h˜(S))− piS′i (h˜(S))∣∣∣ ≤ 2 , then ∣∣∣piSi (h˜(S))− piS′i (h˜(S))∣∣∣ ≥ 2 (triangle inequality); thus,
Pr
(S,S′)∼Dm
(
∃h :
∣∣∣piSi (h)− piS′i (h)∣∣∣ ≥ 2
)
≥ Pr
(S,S′)∼Dm
(∣∣∣piSi (h˜(S))− piS′i (h˜(S))∣∣∣ ≥ 2
)
≥ Pr
(S,S′)∼Dm
(∣∣∣pii(h˜(S))− piSi (h˜(S))∣∣∣ ≥  ∩ ∣∣∣pii(h˜(S))− piS′i (h˜(S))∣∣∣ ≤ 2
)
= ES∼Dm
[
1
(∣∣∣pii(h˜(S))− piSi (h˜(S))∣∣∣ ≥ ) PrS′|S
(∣∣∣pii(h˜(S))− piS′i (h˜(S))∣∣∣ ≤ 2
)]
≥ 12 PrS∼Dm
(∣∣∣pii(h˜(S))− piSi (h˜(S))∣∣∣ ≥ )
= 12 PrS∼Dm
(
∃h :
∣∣∣pii(h)− piSi (h)∣∣∣ ≥ ) ,
since S,S ′ are independent and due to Claim C.1.
Step 2 – Permutations: We denote Γ2m as the set of all permutations of [2m] that swap i and
m+ i in some subset of [m]. Namely,
Γ2m = {σ ∈ Π([2m]) | ∀i ∈ [m] : σ(i) = i ∨ σ(i) = m+ i;∀i, j ∈ [2m] : σ(i) = j ⇔ σ(j) = i},
where Π([2m]) denotes the set of permutations over [2m]. In addition, for S = (z1, . . . , z2m), let
σ(S) = (zσ(1), . . . , zσ(2m)). Notice that for every σ ∈ Γ2m it holds that
Pr
(S,S′)∼Dm
(
∃h :
∣∣∣piSi (h)− piS′i (h)∣∣∣ ≥ 2
)
= Pr
(S,S′)∼Dm
(
∃h :
∣∣∣piσ(S)i (h)− piσ(S′)i (h)∣∣∣ ≥ 2
)
;
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hence,
Pr
(S,S′)∼D2m
(
∃h :
∣∣∣piSi (h)− piS′i (h)∣∣∣ ≥ 2
)
= 12m
∑
σ∈Γ2m
Pr
(S,S′)∼D2m
(
∃h :
∣∣∣piσ(S)i (h)− piσ(S′)i (h)∣∣∣ ≥ 2
)
= 12m
∑
σ∈Γ2m
E(S,S′)∼D2m
1
∃h:
∣∣∣piσ(S)i (h)−piσ(S′)i (h)∣∣∣≥ 2

= E(S,S′)∼D2m
 1
2m
∑
σ∈Γ2m
1
∃h:
∣∣∣piσ(S)i (h)−piσ(S′)i (h)∣∣∣≥ 2

= E(S,S′)∼D2m
[
Pr
σ∈Γ2m
(
∃h :
∣∣∣piσ(S)i (h)− piσ(S′)i (h)∣∣∣ ≥ 2
)]
≤ sup
(S,S′)∼D2m
[
Pr
σ∈Γ2m
(
∃h :
∣∣∣piσ(S)i (h)− piσ(S′)i (h)∣∣∣ ≥ 2
)]
. (17)
Step 3 – Reduction to finite class: Fix (S,S ′) and consider a random draw of σ ∈ Γ2m. For each
strategy profile h, the quantity
∣∣∣piσ(S)i (h)− piσ(S′)i ∣∣∣ is a random variable. Since W ∩ S represents
the number of distinct strategy profiles in the empirical game over S (see Subsection 3.1), there are
at most ΠW(2m) such random variables.
Pr
σ∈Γ2m
(
∃h :
∣∣∣piσ(S)i (h)− piσ(S′)i (h)∣∣∣ ≥ 2
)
≤ ΠW(2m) sup
h∈H
Pr
σ∈Γ2m
(∣∣∣piσ(S)i (h)− piσ(S′)i (h)∣∣∣ ≥ 2
)
(18)
Step 4 – Hoeffding’s inequality: By viewing the previous equation as Rademacher random
variables, we have
Pr
σ∈Γ2m
(∣∣∣piσ(S)i (h)− piσ(S′)i (h)∣∣∣ ≥ 2
)
= Pr
σ∈Γ2m
 1
m
∣∣∣∣∣∣
m∑
j=1
wi(zσ(j),h)− wi(zσ(j+m),h)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≥ 2

= Pr
r∈{−1,1}m
 1
m
∣∣∣∣∣∣
m∑
j=1
rj (wi(zj ,h)− wi(zj+m,h))
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≥ 2
 .
Observe that for every j it holds that rj (wi(zj ,h)− wi(zj+m,h)) ∈ [−1, 1], and
Erj∈{−1,1} [rj (wi(zj ,h)− wi(zj+m,h))] = 0
holds due to symmetry. By applying Hoeffding’s inequality we obtain
Pr
r∈{−1,1}m
 1
m
∣∣∣∣∣∣
m∑
j=1
rj (wi(zj ,h)− wi(zj+m,h))
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≥ 2
 ≤ 2e−m28 . (19)
Finally, by combining Equations (16),(17),(18) and (19) we derive the desired result.
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Proof of Theorem 3.5. The theorem follows immediately by applying the union bound on the
inequality obtained in Lemma 3.4 and by substituting ΠW(2m) according to Claim 3.3 and Lemma
3.2.
Proof of Lemma 3.7. The lemma is proven by showing that an induced game has a potential
function Φ : H∩ S → R, and relying on the results of Monderer and Shapley [19]. Namely, we show
a function Φ such that for every i,h and h′i it holds that
pii(h)− pii(h′i,h−i) = Φ(h)− Φ(h′i,h−i).
Let N(zj ;h) denote the number of players satisfying the point zj under h, namely N(zj ;h) =∑N
i=1 I(zj , hi). Next, let Φ(h) def= 1m
∑m
j=1
∑N(zj ;h)
k=1
1
k , and observe that
pii(h)− pii(h′i,h−i) =
1
m
m∑
j=1
wi(zj ;h)− 1
m
m∑
j=1
wi(zj ;h′i,h−i)
= 1
m
m∑
j=1
Ii(z;hi)
|N(z;h)| −
1
m
m∑
j=1
Ii(z;h′i)
|N(z;h′i,h−i)|
+ 1
m
m∑
j=1
N(zj ;h−i)∑
k=1
1
k
− 1
m
m∑
j=1
N(zj ;h−i)∑
k=1
1
k
= 1
m
m∑
j=1
N(zj ;h)∑
k=1
1
k
− 1
m
m∑
j=1
N(zj ;hi,h−i)∑
k=1
1
k
= Φ(h)− Φ(h′i,h−i).
Since the empirical game is finite (i.e., finite number of players with finite strategy space for each
player), we conclude that it possesses at least one PNE.
Proof of Lemma 3.9. Let N(zj ;h) as in the proof of Lemma 3.7. In each iteration of the
dynamics it holds that
Φ(h′i,h−i)− Φ(h) = pii(h′i,h−i)− pii(h) ≥ . (20)
Notice that
Φ(h) = 1
m
m∑
j=1
N(zj ;h)∑
k=1
1
k
≤ 1
m
m∑
j=1
N∑
k=1
1
k
≤ lnN + 1. (21)
Since the potential is bounded by lnN + 1 and increases by at least  per iteration throughout the
dynamics, after at most lnN+1 iterations, it will reach its maximum value, thereby obtaining an
-PNE.
Proof of Lemma 3.10. By Equation (5), we look for m that satisfies
4N(2em)10
∑N
i=1 die−
2m
8 ≤ δ
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for given , δ; thus
(2em)10
∑N
i=1 die−
2m
8 ≤ δ4N
⇒ 10d log(2em)− 
2m
8 ≤ log
δ
4N
2m
8 ≥ 10d log(2em)− log
δ
4N
m ≥ 80d log(2em)
2
− 8
2
log δ4N
m ≥ 80d
2
log(m) + 80d log(2e)
2
+ 8
2
log 4N
δ
. (22)
Next,
Claim B.1 ([24], Section A). Let a ≥ 1 and b > 0. If m ≥ 4a log(2a) + 2b, then m ≥ a logm+ b.
Set a = 80d
2 and b =
80d log(2e)
2 +
8
2 log
4N
δ . Due to Claim B.1, we know that every m that satisfies
m ≥ 320d
2
log
(160d
2
)
+ 160d log(2e)
2
+ 16
2
log
(4N
δ
)
also satisfies Equation (22).
Proof of Lemma 3.11. Notice that for every i, h′i it holds that
pii(h′i,h−i)− pii(h) = pii(h′i,h−i)− piSi (h′i,h−i) + piSi (h′i,h−i)− pii(h)
h is an

2 -empirical-PNE≤ pii(h′i,h−i)− piSi (h′i,h−i) + piSi (h)− pii(h) +

2;
therefore, if pii(h′i,h−i) − pii(h) >  then at least one of pii(h′i,h−i) − piSi (h′i,h−i) > 4 or piSi (h) −
pii(h) > 4 must hold. Overall,
Pr
S∼Dm
(h is not an -PNE) = Pr
S∼Dm
(∃i ∈ N , h′i ∈ Hi : pii(h′i,h−i)− pii(h) > )
≤ Pr
S∼Dm
(
∃i ∈ N , h′i ∈ Hi : pii(h′i,h−i)− piSi (h′i,h−i) >

4 or pi
S
i (h)− pii(h) >

4
)
≤ Pr
S∼Dm
(
∃i ∈ N , h′i ∈ Hi :
∣∣∣∣pii(h′i,h−i)− piSi (h′i,h−i) > 4
∣∣∣∣ or ∣∣∣∣piSi (h)− pii(h) > 4
∣∣∣∣)
≤ Pr
S∼Dm
(
∃i ∈ N : sup
h′′∈H
∣∣∣pii(h′′)− piSi (h′′)∣∣∣ ≥ 4
)
m≥m 
4 ,δ≤ δ.
Proof of Theorem 4.1. The proof of this theorem is identical to the proof of Ben-Porat and
Tennenholtz [5, Theorem 2], and hence omitted.
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Proof of Claim 5.1. Denote S = (x1, . . . , xm) ∈ Xm and r ∈ Rm such that Hi pseudo-shatters
S with witness r. We prove the claim by showing that we can construct S ′ ∈ Zm that is shattered
by Fi. For every binary vector b ∈ {−1, 1}m there exists hb such that sign(hb(xj) − rj) = bj for
every j ∈ [m].
Denote H = {hb ∈ Hi}b∈{−1,1}m such that |H| = 2m. For every j such that rj ≥ 0, let
yj = min
{
0, min
hb∈H
hb(xj)
}
.
In addition, for every j such that rj < 0, let
yj = max
{
0, max
hb∈H
hb(xj)
}
,
and denote
S ′ = (xj , yj , |rj | − sign(rj)tj)mj=1 .
We now show that Fi shatters S ′. Fix an arbitrary b ∈ {−1, 1}m, and observe that in case rj ≥ 0{
bj = 1
bj = −1
⇒
{
hb(xj) ≥ rj
hb(xj) < rj
⇒
{
hb(xj)− yj ≥ rj − yj
hb(xj)− yj < rj − yj
⇒
{
|hb(xj)− yj | ≥ rj − yj
|hb(xj)− yj | < rj − yj
, (23)
where the last argument holds since hb(xj) ≥ yj . Alternatively, if rj < 0 we have{
bj = 1
bj = −1
⇒
{
hb(xj) ≥ rj
hb(xj) < rj
⇒
{
−hb(xj) + yj ≤ −rj + yj
−hb(xj) + yj > −rj + yj
⇒
{
|−hb(xj) + yj | ≤ |rj |+ yj
|−hb(xj) + yj | > |rj |+ yj
, (24)
where again the last set of inequalities holds since hb(xj) ≤ yj . In case one of Equations (23)
and (24) holds in equality, we can slightly shift rj (as was done in the proof of Claim A.1); hence
we assume that these are strict inequalities. The expression in Equation (23) corresponds to
I(hb, (xj , yj , rj − yj)), while that of Equation (24) corresponds to I(hb, (xj , yj , |rj |+ yj)).
This analysis applies for every b; hence, Fi shatters S ′ as required.
Proof of Claim 5.3. We prove the claim by showing that for every h ∈ H1 and  > 0 there exists
h′ ∈ H such that p˜i2(h, h′) ≥ 23 − . The assertion will then follow due to symmetry (H1 = H2).
Let h = (a, b) ∈ H1 denote an arbitrary strategy and fix  > 0. We denote by L,C,R the left,
center and right squares of U with respect to the horizontal axis, i.e.,
L = ([0, 1]× [1, 2]) , C = ([1, 2]× [0, 1]) , R = ([2, 3]× [1, 2]) .
In addition, let 1L(h) indicate whether h crosses L, namely
1L(h) =
{
1 {(x, y) | ax+ b = y} ∩ L 6= ∅
0 otherwise
,
and similarly for 1C(h),1R(h). We proceed by an exhaustive case analysis over the alternatives for
1L(h) + 1C(h) + 1R(h):
• If 1L(h) + 1C(h) + 1R(h) ≤ 1, by taking h′ to be parallel to h and close enough, player 2 can
get at least 23 .
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• Else, if 1L(h) + 1C(h) + 1R(h) = 2, we have three sub-cases:
– In case 1L(h) = 1R(h) = 1, denote by Lab (Lbl) the set of points above (below) h inside
L, namely
Lab = {(x, y) ∈ L | ax+ b ≤ y} , Lbl = {(x, y) ∈ L | ax+ b > y} .
Similarly, let Rab (Rbl) denote the set of points above (below) h inside R. Let λ(A)
denote the Lebesgue measure (informally, the area) of a set A ⊂ R2. Notice that by
selecting the appropriate h′, player 2 can obtain a payoff arbitrarily close to
1
3 (λ(C) + max {λ(Lbl) + λ(Rab), λ(Lab) + λ(Rbl)}) ≥
2
3 ,
where the inequality follows from having λ(Lbl)+λ(Rab)+λ(Lab)+λ(Rbl) = λ(L)+λ(R) =
2.
– In case 1L(h) = 1C(h) = 1, let Lab, Lbl be as in the previous case, and also define Cab, Cbl
in the same manner. Here too, player 2 can obtain a payoff arbitrarily close to
1
3 (λ(R) + max {λ(Lbl) + λ(Cbl), λ(Lab) + λ(Cab)}) ≥
2
3 ,
where the inequality follows from having λ(Lbl)+λ(Cbl)+λ(Lab)+λ(Cab) = λ(L)+λ(C) =
2.
– The case of 1R(h) = 1C(h) = 1 is symmetric to the previous case.
• Finally, if 1L(h) + 1C(h) + 1R(h) = 3, then h = (0, 1). In this case, by taking h′ = (0, 1 + 3),
player 2 obtains precisely 23 − .
Proof of Lemma 5.4. Let G˜ = 〈Z˜, D˜,N ,H, p˜i〉. We define an auxiliary game G = 〈Z,D,N ,H, pi〉
such that T = {0}, Z = Z˜ × T and D such that
∀Z ⊆ Z˜ : D(Z × T ) = D˜(Z).
We use the tilde notation to describe the elements of G˜, and by non-tilde to denote the elements of
G.
Recall that G˜ is realizable, and let h∗i ∈ Hi such that h∗i (x) = y for every (x, y) ∈ Z˜. By
definition of h, which is a function of the sample S˜, piSi (h∗i ,h−i) ≤ piSi (h) holds in G. By slightly
modifying the proof of Lemma 3.11 (the first inequality, as h is a PNE of the empirical game of
G and not an 2 -PNE as analyzed there), we know that with probability of at least 1− δ over the
selection of S it holds that
∀i ∈ N : sup
h′i∈Hi
pii(h′i,h−i)− pii(h) = pii(h∗i ,h−i)− pii(h) < . (25)
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Using the definitions of w˜i, wi and Equation (25) we obtain that
p˜ii(h∗i ,h−i)− p˜ii(h) = E(x,y)∼D˜ [w˜i(x, y;h∗i ,h−i)− w˜i(x, y;h)]
= E(x,y)∼D˜
[
1hi(x) 6=y
|B(z˜;h∗i ,h−i)|
]
= E(x,y,0)∼D
[
1hi(x)6=y
|B(z˜;h∗i ,h−i)|
]
= E(x,y,0)∼D
[
1hi(x)6=y
1 +∑i′∈N\{i} I(x, y, 0, hi)
]
= E(x,y,0)∼D
[
1hi(x) 6=ywi(x, y, 0;h
∗
i ,h−i)
]
= E(x,y,0)∼D [wi(x, y, 0;h∗i ,h−i)− wi(x, y, 0;h)]
= pii(h∗i ,h−i)− pii(h)
< , (26)
where the last inequality holds with probability at least 1− δ. As a result, with probability at least
1− δ,
∀i ∈ N : sup
h′i∈Hi
p˜ii(h′i,h−i)− p˜ii(h) = p˜ii(h∗i ,h−i)− p˜ii(h) < . (27)
This concludes the proof of the lemma.
C Additional claims and proofs
Claim C.1. For a given h and m ≥ 2
2 it holds that
Pr
S′∼Dm
(∣∣∣pii(h)− piS′i (h)∣∣∣ ≤ 2
)
≥ 12 . (28)
Proof of Claim C.1. Recall Chebyshev’s inequality
Pr (|X − E[x]| ≥ ) ≤ Var(X)
2
.
Applying it for our problem, we get
Pr
S′∼Dm
(∣∣∣pii(h)− piS′i (h)∣∣∣ ≥ 2
)
≤ Var(pi
S′
i (h))
2
4
.
Notice that piS′i (h) is the average of independent random variables bounded in the [0, 1] segment;
hence, by Popoviciu’s inequality on variances we have
Var(piS′i (h)) ≤
1
4m.
Finally, for m ≥ 2
2 it holds that
Pr
S′∼Dm
(∣∣∣pii(h)− piS′i (h)∣∣∣ ≤ 2
)
= 1− Pr
S′∼Dm
(∣∣∣pii(h)− piS′i (h)∣∣∣ ≥ 2
)
≥ 1−
1
4m
2
4
= 1− 1
2m
≥ 12 .
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Claim C.2. Let m ≥ 15, (Xi)mi=1 be a sequence of i.i.d. Bernoulli r.v. with p = 12 , and let
X¯ = 1m
∑m
i=1Xi. Then Pr
(
1
2 < X¯ <
3
4
)
≥ 14 .
Proof of Claim C.2. By Hoeffding’s inequality we have Pr
(
X¯ ≥ (p+ )
)
≤ exp (−22m). There-
fore
Pr
(1
2 < X¯ <
3
4
)
= Pr
(
X¯ <
3
4
)
− Pr
(
X¯ ≤ 12
)
= 1− Pr
(
X¯ ≥ 34
)
− 12
= 14≥ 12 − e
−m
8
m≥15≥ 14 .
D Details for Subsection 4.2
In all simulations, we selected m = 100 points. The distribution over X × Y × T was the product
distribution DX · DY · DT , such that DX is Uni[0, 5] and DY as appear in Subsection 4.2 with the
following parameters:
1. Linear: For every instance x, y = 2x+ 1 +  for  ∼ Normal(0, 1).
2. V-shape: The value of every x is determined by y = 5 |x− 2.5|+ 1 +  for  ∼ Normal(0, 1).
3. X-shape: For every instance x, the value y is distributed as follows:
y =
{
5x+ 0 +  w.p. 12
−5x+ 25 +  w.p. 12
,
where  ∼ Normal(0, 1).
4. Piecewise: For every x, the value y is given by
y =
{
10x+ 1 +  if x ≤ 2.5
2x+ 18 +  else
,
where  ∼ Normal(0, 1).
In addition, the tolerance level was deterministic, i.e., DT was the degenerate deterministic distribu-
tion over a value t, such that
1. Linear: High - t = 32 ,Medium - t =
2
3 , Low - t =
1
3 .
2. V-shape: High - t = 21 ,Medium - t =
1
1 , Low - t =
1
2 .
3. X-shape: High - t = 21 ,Medium - t =
1
1 , Low - t =
1
2 .
4. Piecewise: High - t = 31 ,Medium - t =
3
2 , Low - t =
1
2 .
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